Battery Passport Access Rights

Thirty-Second Statement: Battery Passport Access Rights – The Role Opens the Door, Not the Name

GISAD – Global Institute for Structure relevance, Anonymity and Decentralisation · Statement on the draft Commission Implementing Regulation on access rights to certain parts of the battery passport (Initiative 16473)

Core thesis: The draft of 19 October 2026 defines, for the first time, who may open the non-public parts of the battery passport – repairers, recyclers, purchasers. Defining access through roles is structurally right. But roles without a verification procedure are unenforceable, and verification must not become identification. A product passport that registers persons does not survive its own purpose.

1. Roles, not persons

A recycler needs access because they recycle – not because of who they are. Proof of role should therefore be provided once, signed, and followed by role-based access without personal identification. Identity only where identity is necessary. Otherwise the product passport becomes a register of persons, and a circular-economy instrument turns into a surveillance instrument.

2. Access logs yes, movement profiles no

The draft is silent on access logs. Restricted passport data (Annex XIII, points 2 and 4) must be logged in a way that is verifiable but not personally attributable. Whoever retrieves restricted data must be traceable to the system – not the operator to the person. And the state-of-health and usage data of an individual battery (charging cycles, degradation) must never become a movement profile of its owner.

3. The gap between role list and operating system

Roles without a verification procedure cannot be configured: who grants access when nobody knows how the role is checked? The Commission’s FAQ refers to national registers – which risks twenty-seven different verification systems and therefore twenty-seven different doors. GISAD calls for a measurable minimum procedure (criteria, deadlines, contestability) that is implemented decentrally. A rule that can only be enforced nationally is not a single-market rule.

4. Late act, punctual obligation

Article 77(9) set a deadline of 18 August 2026; the draft followed two months later. Yet the passport obligation starts on 18 February 2027 regardless. Deadlines do not protect – structure protects. An act planned for adoption in January 2027 leaves operators weeks instead of months. The examination procedure must not end in a symbolic review under time pressure.

5. Transfer on resale must be structural

Allowing purchasers to share point 4 data with prospective buyers is the right idea: second-hand markets live on condition transparency. But access must pass to the new role – structurally, through the passport itself – and not through copies of sensitive data from hand to hand. Otherwise transparency at first resale becomes uncontrolled circulation by the third.

Conclusion: The battery passport is the European Union’s first mandatory digital product passport. How it regulates access today will shape every passport that follows. The role opens the door – not the name. The feedback period on the draft runs until 16 November 2026. GISAD publishes this statement openly on its own website; legitimacy derives from registration in the EU Transparency Register.

GISAD – Global Institute for Structure relevance, Anonymity and Decentralisation · Registered in the EU Transparency Register, No. 244298340978-40

Sources: European Commission, Have Your Say, Initiative 16473 – Commission Implementing Regulation on access rights to certain parts of the battery passport: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/16473-Commission-Implementing-Regulation-on-access-rights-to-certain-parts-of-the-battery-passport_en · Batteries Regulation (EU) 2023/1542: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32023R1542

Standardisation Regulation

Thirty-First Statement: European Standardisation Regulation – Speed Must Measure Fidelity, Not Deadlines

GISAD – Global Institute for Structure relevance, Anonymity and Decentralisation · Statement on the European Commission’s proposal for a Regulation on European standardisation, COM(2026) 780 (Initiative 14511)

Core thesis: The proposal to replace Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 is overdue, and its elements – free access to harmonised standards, transparency registers, binding deadlines – point in the right direction. But cutting development time from six years to four measures tempo, not quality. A standard that certifies conformity without measuring structure certifies paper. Those who accelerate standards must measure fidelity – otherwise they merely accelerate the claim.

1. Free access to standards is a matter of the rule of law

Harmonised standards form part of Union law, as the Court of Justice of the European Union has established. Whoever pays for access to the law pays for their own right. The central repository announced in the proposal is therefore the correct step – but it must be machine-readable, barrier-free and accessible without mandatory registration. The door to participation must not stand behind a door to identity verification. This principle applies to consultation portals, and it applies to the texts of the law itself.

2. Four years instead of six is a pace, not a quality

Shortening development times does not solve the underlying problem: many harmonised standards certify processes rather than outcomes. The proposal needs binding measurement criteria for every standardisation request – above all for conceptual fidelity (does the standard measure what the legislation demands?) and for structural effect (interoperability, exit options, avoidance of vendor lock-in). Key performance indicators that only track deadlines measure dates, not fidelity.

3. Alternative award routes require transparency, or they become forum shopping

The possibility of addressing standardisation requests to designated standards development organisations when CEN, CENELEC and ETSI decline, delay or underperform is legitimate as a lever. But the selection must be verifiable. The transparency registers foreseen in the proposal are the right mechanism: they must show whose interests are represented in every standardisation body. Corporate interests belong on the record; natural persons, following the European principle of justice, deserve anonymity protection. Those who verify must themselves be open to verification.

4. The interim presumption of conformity is risky

A harmonised standardisation deliverable that already carries presumption of conformity before the final standard is cited in the Official Journal shifts verification risks onto the market. This is acceptable only if withdrawal is automatic and time-bound, and if the deliverable undergoes the same substantive scrutiny as the finished standard. Interim presumption must not become interim leniency.

5. Standards for AI and cybersecurity must measure structure, not processes

The lack of harmonised standards in artificial intelligence and cybersecurity is the symptom of a systemic flaw: to date, processes and products have been certified. Resilience, however, arises from measurable structure – provenance, decentralisation, fault tolerance. The new standardisation mandates under the AI Act, the Cyber Resilience Act and the revised Cybersecurity Act should make these dimensions mandatory. Otherwise Europe will certify dependency – at high speed.

Conclusion: Regulation 1025/2012 built a partnership; the proposal rebuilds it under time pressure. GISAD supports the acceleration – on one condition: the new system must measure what the old one only asserted. Fidelity is created not by examples, but by measurement. The feedback period on the proposal runs until 10 December 2026. GISAD publishes this statement openly on its own website; legitimacy derives from registration in the EU Transparency Register.

GISAD – Global Institute for Structure relevance, Anonymity and Decentralisation · Registered in the EU Transparency Register, No. 244298340978-40

Sources: European Commission, Have Your Say, Initiative 14511 – Standardisation Regulation revision: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14511-Standardisation-Regulation-revision_en · Commission proposal COM(2026) 780: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52026PC0780

Communication on fake news and online misinformation

The 2018 Communication on Fake News and Online Misinformation – A Retrospective

Statement by GISAD – Global Institute for Structure relevance, Anonymity and Decentralisation

A self-commitment without an audit is advertising.

The Commission Communication of 2018 (COM(2018) 236) was the founding moment of European disinformation policy – and a political failure of the first order. The state let the platforms grade their own homework. The Commission knew full well that disinformation is not a marginal phenomenon but a business model – and it treated it like a misunderstanding to be politely resolved with a voluntary code. Seven years were lost before the Digital Services Act had to follow up.

What 2018 got right

Only one thing: It would have been wrong to demand what authoritarians have always demanded – an authority that decides what is true. Such a ministry of truth would itself be the greater structural hazard to democracy. Content-based censorship is and remains the wrong instrument. But whoever rejects censorship has the duty to measure structure. The Commission rejected the one – and omitted the other.

What 2018 got wrong

The 2018 Code of Practice was a fig leaf: no indicators, no verification, no sanctions. Transparency without verification is self-display. The platforms reported what suited them – and politics called it progress. The damage account is well known: a new version in 2022, integration into the DSA in 2025, auditable obligations only since 1 July 2025. Seven years of repair for a mistake that was avoidable in 2018: the renunciation of measurement. Concept fidelity is not created by examples, but by measurement – including in the self-regulation of corporations.

The open question of today

The first transparency reports under the DSA Code are on the table – and the Commission expressly refuses to assess whether the measures are sufficient. This is the old lie of 2018 in a new guise: whoever collects reports instead of measuring effect is doing file administration, not regulation. What must be measured is what costs money and reach: demonetised advertising revenues in euros, the reach of debunked content, the speed of amplification, the independence of auditors. Everything else is figure cosmetics.

Conclusion. European disinformation policy should hold fast to the prohibition of a ministry of truth – and finally enforce the measurement of the amplification structure: independent audits with published methodology, mandatory access for researchers, structural indicators with automatic sanctions. Whoever sells attention also sells the conflict – but a conflict that a platform amplifies algorithmically is no longer an opinion. It is a product. Products can be measured. And what can be measured can be regulated. The 2018 Communication saved Europe from censorship – not from unmeasurability. That is the lesson for every future code: a voluntary commitment is worth exactly as much as its verification – and whoever refuses to be audited has something to hide.

GISAD – Global Institute for Structure relevance, Anonymity and Decentralisation · Registered in the EU Transparency Register, No. 244298340978-40

Sources: European Commission – Have your say: Communication on fake news and online misinformation · EUR-Lex – COM(2018) 236 · European Commission – The Code of Conduct on Disinformation