2038 Remaining Dependencies on Autocratic Systems (November 2026)



"Trusted WEB 4.0 is the Integration of all resources available via the Web into an overall system.

Machines, devices and people are globally accessible, organized in decentralized, anonymous structures.

Trusted WEB 4.0 maps pre-digital social structures.

The value chains are being reorganised."
(Olaf Berberich, 2007)

2038 – Remaining Dependencies on Autocratic Systems

Free background study for the annual series 1985–2045

November 4, 2026: Democracy Responds

In the night from November 3 to November 4, 2026, the Democrats in the United States won both chambers of Congress. In the Senate, seven previously Republican seats flipped – in North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Iowa, Kansas, Texas and Maine. [1] Texas and Kansas elected their first Democratic senators in decades; in Maine, the nearly thirty-year career of Susan Collins came to an end. [2] In the House of Representatives, the projections the following morning stood at 258 to 259 of 435 seats – well above the majority threshold of 218, the largest Democratic majority in almost two decades. [3] The wave carried the message of no single party, but the frustration of the voters: about high prices, about the war in Iran, about the concern that their own government is testing the limits of the system. [4] Donald Trump's approval in the exit polls was 38 percent – the lowest value ever measured for a sitting president at midterms. [5] He announced that he would accept the result and work with the Democrats; [6] his White House nonetheless presented itself as "defiant", warned the other side to buckle up, and shifted the blame onto individual Republican candidates. [7] For this study, that evening is more than a date. The thesis of October 2026 read: if Trump is put under pressure by Democrats in the House and in the Senate, there is still a chance for democracy. November 3 fulfilled that condition – and with it set the frame for this year: the contest between autocracies and democracies. That evening demonstrated the mechanism that all autocracies lack: a democracy can vote out a failed development without damaging the state. Honesty requires the other side to be told as well: a president remains in office for two more years, the executive remains powerful, and a political camp that does not understand a defeat as an answer to its own policies did not appear only with this election. The window is open, not closed. But it is open – and that changes the chances of the EU-D-S.

The Starting Position: Two Levels of Dependency

What in 2026 still depends on autocratic systems and a few third countries is distributed across two levels that are often thrown into one pot yet move at different speeds. On the software level – platforms, data, AI, payments, identity, language – independence is achievable by 2038; here it is design, not geography, that decides. On the physical layer – leading-edge chips, final manufacturing, rare earths, the last step of the energy transition – dependencies remain that will not be resolved by 2038, only survived. **2038 is** not the year in which Europe becomes independent – it is the year in which it is decided whether independence on the software side is enough to survive the remaining hardware dependency.

The Software Side: Independence Is Achievable

According to the basic assumption of this scenario, by 2038 roughly half of the population organizes itself within the EU-D-S; the other half continues to live and work in the existing system. The EU-D-S is a parallel system – its rules and prohibitions apply within the system, not to states. On this side, independence is no longer a question of feasibility, but of dissemination: the metadata principle halves the need for computing and transmission; platforms are not copied but made superfluous, because administration, payment and validation run in the cooperative and regional structures; the system's own payment infrastructure with an instant-payment wallet and an offline-capable value exchange draws the lesson from Russia's exclusion from SWIFT; getmySense opens up 2,500 written languages that no gatekeeper has ever served. And the divide between participants and non-participants is not a flaw of the concept, but part of its effect: as long as the autocrats still see a chance of prevailing, it even prevents a war.

Semiconductors: The Remaining Core Vulnerability

The physical layer looks different. TSMC manufactures around 60 percent of all the world's chips and around 90 percent of the nodes below 7 nanometers; Samsung produces the rest; Intel cancelled the Magdeburg plans in 2025. [8] ASML – the only EUV lithography company in the world, and a European one – did not sell a single system in Europe in the first half of 2026, because Europe only builds mature nodes from 12 to 28 nanometers. [9] The ESMC fab in Dresden (TSMC-led, 15 billion euros) starts production in 2027; Infineon's Smart Power Fab was the first Chips Act flagship on July 2, 2026 – both in the mature segment. [10] The European Court of Auditors considers the Chips Act's 20 percent target unreachable and projects 11.7 percent; the Commission's scoreboard showed nine percent in June 2026. [11] Europe has virtually no final manufacturing capacity – even "Made in Europe" chips travel to Asia for packaging and testing. [12] The Chips Act 2.0 adds the demand side for the first time; a European leading-edge foundry would arrive at best between 2030 and 2033 – just within the 2038 horizon, but not ahead of it. [13] ASML itself warned back in 2022: without intervention, Europe will become "practically irrelevant" on a global scale.

For 2038, this means two things. The systems of the EU-D-S – trust stations, robots, edge devices – run on mature nodes; with the PDS hardware standard, that is feasible even against backdoors. But the most powerful hardware – smartphones, AI accelerators, data centers – remains imported, and with it the risk remains concentrated: the most advanced manufacturing in the world is located on an island over which no democratic system has command.

Rare Earths: The Chokepoint Hardens

China processes around 90 percent of the world's rare earths and dominates tungsten (80 percent) and antimony (60 percent); the export controls of 2025 and 2026 have been cemented in the 15th Five-Year Plan. [15,16] The consequences are measurable:

price explosions of up to sixfold outside China, and for European companies the approval rate for licenses is below 25 percent. [15] On October 9, 2026, the EU secured only "managed access" to Chinese rare earths – administered access, not independence. [17] In Washington, the 54-nation initiative FORGE took the stage in February 2026; the strategic window for Western alternatives is estimated at 12 to 18 months. [18] And every automation enlarges the chokepoint: there are rare-earth motors in every robot. Whoever has eliminated the dependency on products by 2038 can get it back through the means of production.

Energy: The Transition and the Swap Trap

Russia's share of EU gas imports fell from 45 percent (2021) to 12 percent (2025), the volumes from 152 to 36 billion cubic meters. [19] Russian LNG is banned from the end of 2026, pipeline gas from September 2027, with a complete phase-out by 2028 – yet at the start of 2026, Russian imports rose again (pipeline plus 7, LNG plus 11 percent). [20] Renewables already provide 47.3 percent of the EU electricity mix, solar 359 gigawatts, wind 244. [21] In September 2026, the European Court of Auditors attested that REPowerEU had missed its ambitions and warned of the decisive mistake: swapping the dependency on Russia only for a new one – for example US LNG; grids and interconnectors remained the greatest weakness. [22] Here lies the second energy card of the EU-D-S: decentralized generation and control according to its own patent applications DE102017004870A1 and DE102016002956A1 – island-mode operation, energy butler, PV self-sufficiency at the level of the housing block. And here a shift becomes visible that by 2038 turns into a location factor: it is no longer cheap hands, but cheap energy that decides where production takes place.

Automation: The Dependency Migrates to the Means of Production

The hope that automation will dissolve the China dependency on its own does not stand up to the data – because China is the world champion of automation. In 2025, the country installed 354,000 industrial robots, 59 percent of installations worldwide; its stock of around 2.2 million corresponds to roughly 40 percent of the global fleet. Germany managed 24,800 installations – 41 percent of the EU total, but outmatched at a ratio of 14:1. [23] KUKA in Augsburg has been fully owned by the Chinese conglomerate Midea since 2016; Chinese robot manufacturers are currently building up their EU sales networks. [24] In humanoids, China holds around 80 percent of the roughly 13,000 installations worldwide (2025), Europe under 5 percent; Unitree is the volume leader – 5,500 units in 2025, a target of 20,000 for 2026, the R1 at 5,900 dollars – and the 2026 price war pushed entire classes below 10,000 RMB. At the Europe launch of the H1 Pro on July 22, 2026, the Pentagon classified the device as Chinese military technology; the United States is closing its market. [25,26] The examples from China's own factory landscape show the direction: Xiaomi's Dark Factory in Changping builds one smartphone per second on 80,000 square meters without a single human; BYD in Zhengzhou rolls an electric car off the line every 46 seconds, with robots performing 98 percent of the welding. [27] More than 30 million Chinese factory

jobs have disappeared even amid record exports; fully loaded coastal wages are 8 to 10 dollars per hour – the low-wage countries today are India, Mexico and Vietnam. [28]

For the EU-D-S, this is the decisive finding: the household and care robots whose deployment the 2037 study describes could be Chinese in 2038. The butler at the door with a backdoor is not a thought experiment, but the standard case when the PDS hardware standard is missing. **The dependency on China does not end with automation – it migrates from the products to the means of production. Whoever in 2038 merely buys the robots has lost the calculation; whoever feeds them with their own energy, their own raw materials and their own creativity has won it.**

The Talents: The Third Competitor for the Same People

Already in 2026, Germany lacks 79,000 IT professionals (Bitkom); the IW estimates around 106,000 missing digitalization and IT specialists; the German chip industry is short of 62,000 people, and the European semiconductor industry of 75,000 by 2030 according to ESIA – Deloitte even puts the need at 350,000 additional employees. [29,30] In Saxony, the center of the European semiconductor industry, around 81,000 people work in the sector; by 2030 almost 100,000 skilled workers will be missing, with at least 27,000 open positions – the Mittelstand fears the "bloodletting" caused by poaching by the fabs. [31] The TSMC-led ESMC is growing from around 100 to 2,000 employees and brings Taiwanese engineers along; the enticement packages – onboarding in Taiwan, share packages – address money. Infineon is looking for up to 1,000 additional staff in Dresden. [32] The objection that IT demand collapsed in the second quarter of 2026 according to the Hays index confuses the business cycle with structure: the shortage is structural, and the reservoir is zero-sum – every additional competitor for the same people arrives at an empty field. [33] In the 2038 scenario, the EU-D-S becomes the third, structurally different competitor for precisely these people. The fabs pay wages; the EU-D-S pays participation according to performance levels, self-determination and creative latitude – it does not compete on the price tag, but in the motivational profile of the creative class. Here lies the talent paradox: if the EU-D-S pulls the engineers away from the fabs, it undermines its own hardware base. The countermeasure has existed since October 16, 2026: the manufacturers are integrated as passive members and trustees, not bled dry. This closes the circle of the argument: the talent shortage drives the fabs into further automation, automation deepens the dependency on Chinese robots – unless the EU-D-S binds the talents itself and integrates the manufacturers, instead of losing both.

Russia: Erosion Instead of Collapse

The finding for the war economy is erosion, not collapse. The Associated Press summed it up on September 18, 2026: the budget deficit is growing, growth is slowing, interest rates remain high; hundreds of thousands, predominantly young people, have emigrated; the shortage of skilled workers is slowing down arms production. [34] The Stockholm economist Torbjörn Becker calls the trajectory "unsustainable" – but the

timing of any crisis onset "highly uncertain". [35] Marcus Keupp ("Spurwechsel" – "Changing Course", 2025) has the strongest formulation: "perhaps Russia is winning itself to death"; the country is heading toward "North Korea conditions", and the inflation figures are "most probably falsified". For a study, such quotations call for discipline: trajectory yes, dated collapse forecast no. [36] The political frame sharpened in October 2026: on October 16, Trump suspended the Graham Act sanctions against Russia by executive order – in Moscow they spoke of a "historic moment", and the country intends to take the rest of eastern Ukraine militarily; the parliamentary election of September 2026 was staged. [37] For 2038, this does not yield a year of collapse, but a country in continued decline – and a role for the EU-D-S that is built into its founding logic: cooperatives in the Ukrainian and Russian language areas as a reconstruction instrument, for the day the erosion becomes political.

China: Order Through Fear

Beijing has solved the fake news problem in its own way: "rumors" have been legal offenses since the criminal-law interpretation of 2013 – from 5,000 views or 500 forwards, up to three years in prison are possible, and up to ten for defamatory rumors; the practice of 2026 runs through administrative detention (up to ten days) and fines (up to 1,000 yuan), criminally up to seven years. [38] WeChat censors even harmless rumors, according to Citizen Lab; the platforms run their own debunking services. [39] Three corrections belong to honesty: First, misinformation exists anyway – according to CASS, disinformation reaches six out of ten WeChat users, with more than 2.1 million suspicious rumor entries. [40] Second, it is not falsehood that is being suppressed, but political unrest – true statements also count as "rumors" when they disturb the order. Third, the state fills the suppressed citizen debate with its own propaganda. **China has proven that fake news can be defeated with fear – and that creativity is defeated along with them. The West has proven that creativity can be unleashed – and that truth is lost along the way. What nobody has tested yet is the EU-D-S: winning creativity and truth from the same reward system.**

The Untested Combination: Creativity and Truth from One Reward System

The building blocks of this combination are each documented individually. The Good Judgment Project of the IARPA showed that amateur superforecaster teams are around 30 percent more accurate than intelligence analysts. [41] The game Foldit: gamers solved a protein structure in roughly three weeks that science had failed at for over ten years – the players' de novo designs were published in Nature. [42] And AI itself: test users preferred the roughly one-hundred-times-smaller InstructGPT over raw GPT-3, because humans had set the direction. [43] What remains untested is the combination as a whole – participation payment, democratic getmySense validation, AI amplification, creativity incentives, 2,500 languages. The strongest warning comes from science: in 2024, Doshi and Hauser showed that AI increases individual creativity while reducing collective diversity – the homogenization trap. [44] The EU-D-S responds in its design (evaluation diversity across 40 disciplines, trendsetter and follower logic),

but that remains a hypothesis until the system is running. That is why 2027 is the proof window: China cannot test this combination – surveillance freezes diversity; the United States cannot test it – the attention economy rewards fraud. Only a system that feeds creativity and truth from the same source can even pose the question.

The Creativity Exchange Model: Systemically Relevant Instead of Vulnerable to Blackmail

The EU-D-S does not cling to geography: in principle, anyone who follows the rules can participate – including from autocracies, possibly accompanied by a sponsor; sponsors receive full digital democratic rights, partner rights are granted in line with the sponsor's supervision. The lever is not military, but human: whoever remains inside the autocratic system loses creativity bit by bit through surveillance and manipulation. The evidence reaches far back – the Soviet Line X technology procurement, the CPU clone replicas – and it is current: Russian weapons are full of Western microelectronics ("Silicon Lifeline"), and censorship acts as a documented chilling effect on research and art. [45,46] The strategy: the EU-D-S develops creative output early – the combined output of human and AI – in exchange for needed goods and services, until it is systemically relevant even for autocracies. Exchange instead of dependency: the direct answer to the hardware Achilles heel. The limits belong to the picture: China compensates with "segmented freedom" – research autonomy in the natural sciences and engineering, obedience everywhere else; in April 2026, five frontier AI labs launched (Kimi K2.6, Qwen 3.6, DeepSeek V4, GLM-5.1 on Huawei Ascend, MiniMax M2.7), at 5 to 30 times lower costs; the migration of AI researchers to the United States fell by 89 percent. [47] With Russia, systemic relevance is highly realistic; with China, partial. The conditions are technical: WAN anonymity must hold inside autocracies; a payment channel for participation payments is needed, and getmySense as a quality and trust signal. And an early start is needed – from 2027. The global South, finally, loses the ladder of wage labor through automation; the geography-independent participation in the EU-D-S becomes the alternative development model – sponsor partnership instead of the factory line.

The Honesty Rule: What Can Be Replaced by 2038 – and What Cannot

Replaceable by 2038: software, platforms, data, AI, payments, identity, language participation; binding talents through participation according to performance levels; decentralized energy according to its own patents; and the mature hardware layer for trust stations, robots and edge devices – with the PDS hardware standard against backdoors. Not replaceable by 2038: leading-edge chips (a European foundry would arrive at best between 2030 and 2033 and would first have to ramp up), final manufacturing and OSAT capacity in Asia, rare earths beyond "managed access", and the last step of the energy transition through 2027/2028 including the swap danger. 2038 is no year of redemption; it is the year in which it becomes visible whether the software side carries the load.

The Proof of November 3: What Democracies Can Do, and What Autocracies Lack

The Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2026 counts 56 percent of the 137 countries studied as autocracies – a record of hard autocracies; at the same time, democratic resistance is growing. [48] November 3 belongs in this situation as a piece of evidence. The decisive difference between democracies and autocracies is not who wins the elections, but on whom an election imposes consequences: in a democracy, an election has consequences for the powerful – in an autocracy, it has consequences for the voters. The Iran war, the prices, the executive's crossings of the line were punished on November 3 – without a coup, without a breach of the constitution, without blood. [4,5] In Russia, the parliamentary election one month earlier had been staged. [37] For the chances of the EU-D-S, this is perhaps the most important news of the year: a Congress that limits the executive lowers the escalation risk of the transatlantic conflicts – tariffs, IRIS² spectrum, the threats of recent months – and the probability that the United States itself becomes a permanent state of exception. An open window is no guarantee: the majority can flip again in 2030, and two years of executive power remain two years. But the basic assumption of this scenario – that democracies can correct themselves, while autocracies can only erode – received its most recent proof on November 3, 2026.

Outlook

2038 decides on the software side; 2039 draws the consequence and bans central IT for critical infrastructure within the EU-D-S – whatever vulnerability remains in 2038 receives its design counterpart in 2039, in the form of resilience through decentralized networking. The growth curve continues: from roughly half of the population in the EU-D-S in 2038 to the first EU country that organizes its administration entirely within the EU-D-S in 2045 – most likely Ukraine, whose reconstruction the EU-D-S has served as a backbone from the very beginning. And November 3, 2026 confirmed the actual rule of this annual series: dependencies on autocratic systems do not end on their own – but democracies, alone among all forms of system, have the ability to vote them out before they have to be severed.

Footnotes

[1] NPR (Nov 4, 2026): Seven Republican Senate seats flipped – North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Iowa, Kansas, Texas, Maine.

[2] CBS News (Nov 4, 2026): First Democratic senators in decades in Texas (James Talarico) and Kansas (Adam Hamilton); Troy Jackson defeats Susan Collins in Maine (almost 30 years in the Senate); Roy Cooper in North Carolina, Sherrod Brown in Ohio.

[3] CBS News/NBC News (Nov 4, 2026): Projections of 258 to 259 of the 435 House seats; majority threshold 218 – the largest Democratic majority in almost two decades. https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/house-election-results-2026/

[4] AP (Nov 4, 2026): Voter frustration over high prices, the war in Iran and concern about the government's conduct; "new era of congressional resistance".

[5] CBS exit poll/The Independent (Nov 4, 2026): Trump's approval at 38 percent – the lowest value ever measured for a sitting president at midterms. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-approval-rating-midterms-exit-poll-b3078679.ht

[6] AFP (Nov 4, 2026): Trump to the New York Times – accept the result, work with the Democrats.

[7] AFP (Nov 4, 2026): The White House presents itself as "defiant", warns critics ("buckle up"), blames individual Republican candidates.

[8] Semiconductor industry analysis (2026): TSMC around 60% of global chip production, around 90% of nodes below 7 nm; Samsung the rest; Intel cancelled the Magdeburg plans in 2025.

[9] ASML (2026): zero chip manufacturing systems sold in Europe in the first half of 2026 (still 5% of revenue in 2024); Europe only builds mature nodes (12–28 nm).

[10] ESMC (2026): TSMC-led fab in Dresden (15 billion euros), production from 2027; Infineon Smart Power Fab opened on July 2, 2026 as the first Chips Act flagship – mature power segment.

[11] European Court of Auditors (2025): the Chips Act's 20% target for 2030 unreachable, projection 11.7%; EU Chips Scoreboard (June 2026): 9%.

[12] OSAT industry analysis (2026): Europe has virtually no final manufacturing capacity (assembly/packaging/testing) – even "Made in Europe" chips travel to Asia for final manufacturing.

[13] Chips Act 2.0 (2026): demand side addressed for the first time; European leading-edge foundry at best 2030–2033.

[14] ASML (2022): without intervention, Europe becomes "practically irrelevant" on a global scale.

[15] Critical raw materials analyses (2026): China around 90% of global rare-earth processing, 80% tungsten, 60% antimony; price explosions of up to sixfold outside China; license approval rate for European companies below 25%.

[16] Beijing (Oct 9, 2026): export controls on rare earths cemented in the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030).

[17] European Commission (Šefčovič, Oct 9, 2026): only "managed access" to Chinese rare earths – no independence.

[18] US government (February 2026): 54-nation raw materials initiative FORGE; strategic window of 12–18 months for Western alternatives.

[19] EU import statistics (2025): Russian share of EU gas imports 45% (2021) → 12% (2025); volumes 152 → 36 billion cubic meters.

[20] EU (2026): bans on Russian LNG at the end of 2026, on pipeline gas in September 2027, complete phase-out by 2028; renewed increase in Russian imports at the start of 2026 (pipeline +7%, LNG +11%).

[21] EU electricity mix data (end of 2025): 47.3% renewables; solar 359 GW, wind 244 GW.

[22] European Court of Auditors (September 2026): REPowerEU missed its ambitions; warning against swapping the dependency on Russia only for a new dependency (e.g. US LNG); grids and interconnectors the greatest weakness.

[23] IFR, World Robotics (2026): China 354,000 industrial robot installations (2025, 59% worldwide); stock of around 2.2 million (= 40% of the global fleet); Germany 24,800 installations = 41% of the EU total, outmatched at a ratio of 14:1.

[24] Analyses (2026): KUKA (Augsburg) 100% owned by Midea (China) since 2016; Chinese robot manufacturers building up EU sales networks.

[25] IFR/industry reports (2026): China in 2025 around 80% of the roughly 13,000 installed humanoids worldwide, Europe under 5%; Unitree volume leader (5,500 units in 2025, target 20,000 for 2026; R1 at 5,900 dollars, G1 at 16,000 dollars); 2026 price war below 10,000 RMB.

[26] Pentagon (July 22, 2026): Unitree H1 Pro launch in Europe; classified as Chinese military technology; the United States close their market.

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[28] Analyses (2026): more than 30 million Chinese factory jobs lost even amid record exports at the start of 2026; coastal wages fully loaded at 8–10 dollars per hour – the low-wage countries today are India, Mexico, Vietnam.

[29] Bitkom (2026): 79,000 missing IT professionals in Germany; IW: around 106,000 missing digitalization/IT specialists by 2026.

[30] Industry associations/FAZ (2026): 62,000 missing specialists in the German chip industry; ESIA: 75,000 employees by 2030; Deloitte/ESIA: 350,000 additional employees needed by 2030.

[31] dpa/MDR (2026): Silicon Saxony around 81,000 employees (2025), 82,500 jobs in 2026; Saxony needs almost 100,000 sector specialists by 2030, with at least 27,000 open positions; the Mittelstand fears the "bloodletting" caused by poaching.

[32] ESMC (2026): workforce around 100, target 2,000; Taiwanese engineers brought along; enticement packages: onboarding in Taiwan and share packages; Infineon Dresden: up to 1,000 additional staff.

[33] Hays skilled worker index (Q2/2026): IT demand clearly collapsed – a cyclical slump, no contradiction of the structural shortage.

[34] AP (Sept 18, 2026): no immediate collapse, but structural erosion – the budget deficit grows, growth slows, interest rates high; hundreds of thousands (mostly young people) emigrated; the shortage of skilled workers slows down arms production.

[35] Becker, Stockholm School of Economics (2026): trajectory "unsustainable", timing of a crisis onset "highly uncertain".

[36] Keupp, "Spurwechsel. Die neue Weltordnung nach Russlands Krieg" (Quadriga 2025): perhaps Russia wins itself to death; heading toward "North Korea conditions"; inflation figures "most probably falsified".

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[43] RLHF (2022): test users preferred the roughly 100-times-smaller InstructGPT (1.3 billion parameters) over raw GPT-3.

[44] Doshi/Hauser, Science Advances (2024): AI increases individual creativity but reduces collective diversity (homogenization trap).

[45] RUSI, "Silicon Lifeline" (2023): Russian weapons full of Western microelectronics; historically: Soviet Line X technology procurement, CPU clone replicas.

[46] ASPI/AAUP (2026): documented chilling effects of censorship on creativity and research (Great Firewall).

[47] Stanford HAI, AI Index (2026): 89% less AI researcher migration to the United States; China: five frontier AI labs (April 2026: Kimi K2.6, Qwen 3.6, DeepSeek V4, GLM-5.1 on Huawei Ascend, MiniMax M2.7), costs 5–30 times lower.

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-2 BvR 907/24 -, -1 BvR 1426/25 -, -2 BvR 1668/25-
-1 BvR 91/26 -

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