2039 – Resilience Through Decentralized Networking (November 2026)



"Trusted WEB 4.0 is the Integration of all resources available via the Web into an overall system.

Machines, devices and people are globally accessible, organized in decentralized, anonymous structures.

Trusted WEB 4.0 maps pre-digital social structures.

The value chains are being reorganised.“
(Olaf Berberich, 2007)

2039 – Resilience through Decentralized Networking

A free background study for the annual series 1985–2045

October 13, 2026: The Moment the Dependence Became Visible

In the night of October 13–14, 2026, military Starshield terminals in Ukraine were throttled – the very terminals that steer drones, intercept missiles, and carry command communications. It was not Russia that put them out of action, but the most important ally: SpaceX throttled the bandwidth of the mobile terminals and imposed a speed limit of 161 km/h. [1] The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs had to concede that Europe has no alternative in the short term, and Europe's own satellite network, IRIS², will not launch before 2029, becoming fully operational a year later. [2] That night is the starting point of this study, because it shows in a single observation what 2039 must be about: A society whose communication, navigation, and warning systems are tied to a few central layers does not control its own systems at the decisive moment. It holds a permission.

A Disruption-Prone Present – the Evidence Base through 2026

The concern is not a theoretical one. Russia can fake GPS signals from Kaliningrad across hundreds of kilometers; the number of known jammers has grown from three to 36 antennas. [3] On August 24, 2026, telephones, drones, and ships in Poland went "blind". [4] The research service of the US Congress officially lists satellite navigation interference as an instrument of Russian hybrid warfare. [5] In the Baltic Sea, the Balticconnector and a data cable were damaged in 2023, and the subsea cable C-Lion1 between Finland and Germany in 2024 – Germany's defense minister spoke of "sabotage". [6,7] On the digital side, two events showed the same pattern: the global CrowdStrike outage of July 2024 kept aircraft on the ground and left clinics unable to operate; [8] the IT failure at Charité brought admissions, treatment, and documentation to a standstill. [9] The United Nations warn of a "digital pandemic" – a global chain reaction in which a single fault tears down entire supply chains. [10] What all these cases share is not the cause, but the structure: In every instance, a central authority was the single point at which an entire society could be switched off. Centralized IT is the ideal target in cyberwar – a target the adversary does not even have to hit themselves, as CrowdStrike proved.

2039: Centralized IT Is Banned

Against this background, a clear rule applies in 2039: **Within the EU-D-S, centralized IT is banned for critical infrastructure.** The ban is not directed at states – the EU-D-S is a parallel system alongside the existing order, and as of 2038 roughly half the population is organized within it; the other half lives and works unchanged in the existing system. This division is not a flaw of the concept, but part of its effect: 2038

shows that the division even prevents a war, as long as the autocrats still see a chance of prevailing. Those who can still prevail stay within the order they reject. The ban applies to the areas organized in the EU-D-S – the hospitals, administrations, warning systems, and payment transactions of the participants and regional clusters. It is the endpoint of a learning curve that began in 2024: A society that concentrates its critical systems at a few central points offers every attacker a single, easily found target. **Resilience is not created by sealing off, but by redundancy spread wide.** It is not isolation from the network that makes a society robust, but the distribution of network capability across thousands of local points, each of which can absorb the failure of the others.

Networks and Connectivity: The Lever Lies in Data Volume

The first group of central dependencies concerns the physical and logical networks: satellite internet, satellite navigation, subsea cables, mobile switching centers, DNS root servers, and centralized identity management. This is where the decisive property of the EU-D-S applies: It stores only metadata and forgoes the permanent construction of central data mountains. A system that needs only half of the usual computing and transmission capacity is not independent of every single cable – but it remains functional when cables, satellites, or switching centers fail. The Truststation becomes the local network node that supplies groups offline; Wi-Fi mesh structures and drones as relay stations (linking up with the 2038 drone concept) bridge local gaps. Identity and encryption rest on Truststation key sets and WAN anonymity instead of central certificate and identity monopolies; the PDS hardware standard rules out backdoors. This includes an analog layer that the digital debate likes to forget: amateur radio. It is independent of terrestrial infrastructure, distributed across the community, and free of the "choke points" at which mobile networks collapse; the equipment runs on a car battery. [11] During Hurricane Ida in 2021, radio amateurs were the only functioning reporting channel across entire regions. [12] In the EU-D-S, radio amateurs are recognized specialists of the regional clusters – part of the specialists' rulebook, not a hobby at the margins.

Deep Dive on Starlink: What Decentralized Measures Really Replace

The October 2026 throttling does not hit Ukraine in the abstract. It hits above all the interceptor drones that are supposed to shoot down Russian jet drones – too slow under the speed limit; only after days was it lifted. [13] Europe's first reflex reads: a satellite of our own. But IRIS² will not launch before 2029 and becomes fully operational only a year later; the EU High Representative conceded that Europe cannot replace this capability in the short term. [2] Ukraine has therefore put a second path on the table, one the West barely notices: It is not the satellite network that gets replaced, but the need for the connection at the decisive moment. Five measures are documented.

Fiber instead of radio. Ukrainian FPV drones fly on spools of fiber-optic cable ten to more than twenty kilometers long; control runs over the cable, not over radio or satellite.

Such a drone can be neither jammed nor switched off, because there is no connection that a third party controls. [14] At the state accelerator program Brave1, more than fifteen manufacturers tested fiber-optic FPVs on a 20-kilometer route – the answer to the question "What if they switch our network off?" reads here: There is no network. [15]

Intelligence at the edge. In August 2026, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense reported more than seventy AI and machine-vision systems at the front; the stated goal is a machine-vision computer in every frontline drone. [16] Modules such as the TFL-1 cover the final 400 to 500 meters autonomously, after target release by a human – built for the terminal approach in the middle of the jamming field, for around 100 US dollars; an 18-dollar chip suffices for target lock. [17,18] Those who solve the last mile locally no longer need a connection at the decisive moment – not even in the deep airspace where electromagnetic jamming collapses satellite navigation. [19]

Sensors spread wide. The Ukrainian start-up Zvook operates thousands of acoustic sensors distributed across the country; each sensor costs about 500 US dollars and detects drones at five, cruise missiles at seven kilometers – not with radar, but with a recognition model trained on drone noises. Observers compare the system to a giant, decentralized passive sonar. [20,21] For the first time, the mobile version was tested at the NATO exercise BATT26 in Latvia. [22] Improvisations of the same type – cell phones mounted on poles as air-situation sensors – show where the journey leads: away from the one, expensive, attackable sensor, toward many cheap ones. [23]

Citizens as sensors. Since 2022, the ePPO app has turned every citizen into a reporting node: Whoever sees a drone points their smartphone at it and presses a red button; air defense receives the target data. [24,25] The warning survives every central outage, because it lives in the population.

Navigation from the ground. The Pokrova system overlays satellite navigation across the whole country with false signals from the ground: Attacking Shahed drones are steered into empty fields. In November 2024, 95 of 188 attacking drones were diverted this way – without a single satellite. [26,27] Translated into civilian terms, these are precisely the design principles of the EU-D-S: the local physical medium (the Truststation as network node), intelligence on site instead of in the central cloud (processing on the device, the metadata principle), sensors spread wide instead of one central radar, the population as part of the warning chain (WAN-anonymous reports, regional-cluster escalation, drone officers per residential block), and ground-based navigation instead of satellite dependence. **The way out of Starlink dependence does not lead only through satellites of our own – it leads through systems that need no connection at the decisive moment.**

The honesty rule applies here too: Fiber-optic drones have range and cable limits; the terminal AI carries only the last meters while the approach remains network-dependent; Zvook detects but does not fight; Pokrova is itself organized country-wide and centrally. None of this fully replaces the long-range satellite. The decentralized measures do not replace the satellite – they shrink what the satellite is needed for. And exactly this shrinking is the resilience.

Centralized IT and Data: The Central Mode Becomes a State of Exception

The second group concerns what brought things to a standstill in 2024 and 2026: centralized IT in hospitals, administrations, and corporations, central health data, central government portals. The answer of the EU-D-S is decentralized systems with admin copies and a central mode, as described in patent application DE102016002956A1: The unidirectional connection prevents an attack from outside from migrating into the local systems; admin copies allow a restart without central infrastructure; the central mode continues to exist – but as a deliberately declared state of exception, not as the normal state. Health data remain in the sovereignty of the patients and are processed locally (the line that leads to participation in old age in 2040). Administrations do not organize themselves as islands of authority, but as administrative clusters in the cooperative logic of the EU-D-S.

The Cloud Thesis: When Centralization Is Declared a Moral Duty

The dispute over the right architecture took a remarkable turn in 2026. Sam Altman declared that, from a global allocation perspective, it would be "quite terrible" for people to run their own models on their own computers: The world's limited DRAM supply should not sit in private PCs, but in data centers – "maximum utilization in the cloud" was the goal. [28] The error lies not in the scarcity, but in the conclusion: A supply problem is turned into a question of morality. Anyone who computes locally is deemed antisocial – and dependence becomes a virtue.

The EU-D-S takes Altman's own criterion seriously: utilization. Only it is achieved not through the cloud, but through two decentralized principles. First: hardware sized to need, instead of overcapacity. Truststations and PDS devices are dimensioned for the tasks they actually have – getmySense ratings, validation, metadata. The metadata principle saves roughly half of the computing power; those who do not push data mountains across the landscape do not need GPU farms. Second: utilization through tasks, not through location. The robot chip from the 2037 study is the counterexample to the cloud thesis. It is not utilized because a hyperscaler placed it in a hall, but because it takes on coordination tasks in the intranet of the residential block: energy control according to its own patent applications, watch and butler services, presence coordination of the neighborhood chain, help brokerage to the Truststation. At night, when the butler rests, the same chip computes for the block. **Utilization is not created by bundling the hardware in one place – but by bundling the tasks in a neighborhood.**

Time: The Dissolved Dependency

More hidden than navigation is a second dependency of the satellite age: time. GNSS has become the world's timekeeper – power grids synchronize over GPS time, every electronic transaction carries its timestamp, and even sending a message depends on a

shared clock. The expert community now warns that this time distribution is among the most vulnerable infrastructures of all. [29,30] The obvious reflex of the resilience debate reads: rebuild the lost dependency locally – time servers in every Truststation, quartz-controlled backup clocks, a second-best version of satellite time.

The project "das EI" [31] has provided proof that it also works without. All of its developments are programmed without time data. The system measures brightness and knows whether it is day or night; it records movement and recognizes events from the sequence; it sees from the PV yield what the sun is doing right now. It is not the clock that decides, but the state of the surroundings – and the state cannot be switched off. Only when absolute time disappears from a system design does it become clear that it was never the precondition, but a habit. That is why this study does not begin with the technology, but with the mindset: **The second-best solution is the reliable replication of the lost dependency. The best solution is not needing the dependency at all.**

Emergency, Warning, and Specialists: Reachability Instead of a Control Center

The third group concerns those who are needed first when things turn serious. Central warning systems have proven fragile: Cell Broadcast hangs on central switching centers, sirens were dismantled over decades. The decentralized European civil protection system turns the logic around:

Truststation numbers and neighborhood chains make every citizen reachable; regional clusters escalate requests for help onward when the immediate surroundings do not respond. Emergency calls and control centers are complemented by decentralized requests for help that still find their way when the central point is overloaded or has failed. Emergency logistics and basic supplies are held in readiness by regional clusters and neighborhood helpers where central distribution fails.

The specialists deserve particular attention, because they show that decentralized networking is not isolation. Knowledge must not hang on a few centers – but it must not disappear into a thousand isolated groups either. Specialists remain networked across boundaries; a clear rulebook defines when a decentralized group requests help from outside. The rulebook replaces central dispatch: It is not the control center that decides on help, but a defined, trained request. getmySense-validated knowledge is distributed instead of being concentrated in expert monopolies, and local capability – down to the drone officer per residential block – reduces the number of cases in which a specialist from outside is needed at all.

When the Opponent Hacks the Warning Itself

The 2026 evidence base forces a separate point: Warning channels are not only fragile, they are attackable. In the same year, the official emergency apps of Ukraine and Russia were hacked – citizens received fake radiation and war alerts. [32] In Romania, fake RO-ALERT warnings circulated, with the express aim of creating panic. [33] During the

wildfires in British Columbia, fake evacuation orders in the look of official authorities spread. [34] A hacked central channel is more dangerous than a failed one: It destroys the basis of trust on which every warning rests. The answer of the EU-D-S is twofold assurance: Warnings are valid only when signed by the local Truststation, whose authenticity the recipient can verify themselves – and every warning passes through getmySense validation and the Finder fake switch before it sets off a neighborhood chain. A forged central alarm does not reach the broad base, because the broad base does not listen to it, but to its own nodes.

The Quantum Migration: Who Holds the Keys

The 2030s are the decade of a forced redistribution: The cryptography of the past decade is being replaced immediately, because attackers are already collecting encrypted material today in order to decrypt it later with quantum computers – "harvest now, decrypt later". [35] The United States set hard deadlines by executive order in June 2026: critical systems on post-quantum methods by the end of 2030, digital signatures by the end of 2031. [36] Germany's BSI set comparable end dates, and the national implementation guideline followed on October 12, 2026. [37,38] This migration forces new keys for everything anyway – and that is precisely the real question of 2039: Whoever holds the keys holds the dependency. Whoever assigns them to central certification monopolies rebuilds centralized IT under a new name. The EU-D-S assigns the keys decentrally via the Truststation key sets, embedded in WAN anonymity – the forced renewal becomes the opportunity to distribute the architecture correctly instead of merely re-encrypting it.

Energy, Payments, Water: The Physical-Digital Pillars

The fourth group is tied most closely to the physical world through electricity and money. Central power grids become more fragile, not more robust, as the volatile energy transition progresses. The EU-D-S relies on decentralized energy according to patent applications DE102017004870A1 and DE102016002956A1: decentralized generation and control, island operation, an energy butler that balances generation and consumption in the residential block. In payments, the SWIFT exclusion of Russia in 2022 showed that central clearing systems can also be used as a weapon. The EU-D-S's own payment system with the instant-payment wallet returns money to what cash always was: something in the physical possession of the user – including an electronic value wallet that also works during a power outage.

July 2026 added a field to the list that is otherwise gladly forgotten: water. In the United States, more than thirty water utilities of one federal state and systems in a dozen further states came under coordinated cyberattack. [39,40]

Water is and remains a physical dependency: Decentralized digitalization cannot replace it, but it can cushion it – decentralized water cells with local control, monitoring on site, backbone in the neighborhood. The complete answer belongs to the autarky triad of energy, water, and food, the finale of this series in 2045.

The Honesty Rule: Replace or Cushion

This study refrains from declaring decentralized digitalization a cure-all, because it separates two different effects. Fully replaceable by decentralized digitalization are: centralized IT, central data, central warning including the warning channels, emergency-call organization, specialist monopolies, key and cryptography management – and time, if the system is designed without it from the start. Only to be cushioned is the physical layer: satellites, subsea cables, power grids, water lines. Parallel physical structures are still needed here – satellite systems of our own, cable redundancy, decentralized energy plants, decentralized water cells. But the EU-D-S design decides how heavily an outage weighs. **Decentralized digitalization does not replace a single cable – but it takes the catastrophic effect out of every cable break.** A society whose systems work offline, keep only metadata, and hold admin copies experiences the throttling of a satellite system as a slowdown, not as paralysis. That is what separates 2039 from 2026: not the absence of attackers, but the absence of single targets.

The State Builds Centralized – the Study Thinks Decentralized

The contrast with the present became visible in 2026: Germany adopted a ten-billion-euro civil protection program, with a nationwide shelter inventory in the NINA app and a new civil protection command; [41] Denmark put together a 190-million-dollar package for "total preparedness". [42] The return of civil protection is right and overdue. But the architecture of this return is central: one app, one command, one warning center – exactly the structure whose failures and hostile attacks the 2024–2026 evidence base documents. This study does not contradict civil protection; it adds the one layer that is missing from the state's rebuild: breadth. A state can inventory shelters, but it cannot ordain neighborhoods. It can send out warnings, but it cannot guarantee that they reach people when the one app fails or is hacked. What makes 2039 resilient is the combination of the two: the state backbone and the decentralized networking that keeps working when the backbone is hit.

Outlook

In the end, resilience is not only a technical, but a societal property: A society that can reach every citizen through Truststation numbers is also robust in demographic change. The path there is not a revolution, but a growth curve – from roughly half the population in the EU-D-S in 2038 to the first country that organizes its administration entirely in the EU-D-S in 2045: most likely Ukraine, whose reconstruction has served the EU-D-S as a backbone from the beginning. That is the bridge to the next annual block – participation in old age, 2040.

Footnotes

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